

Message Text

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ACTION ACDA-12

INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 IO-13 ISO-00 SOE-02 AF-10 ARA-10
CIAE-00 DODE-00 EA-10 PM-05 H-01 INR-10 L-03
NASA-01 NEA-11 NSAE-00 NSC-05 OIC-02 SP-02 PA-01
DOE-15 CEQ-01 OES-07 SS-15 ICA-11 AID-05 COME-00
EB-08 EPA-01 NSF-01 INT-05 HEW-04 LAB-04 ACDE-00
/188 W

-----061008 101616Z /43

P R 101537Z MAY 78
FM AMEMBASSY BONN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8395
INFO AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY PARIS
USMISSION GENEVA
USMISSION USNATO

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BONN 08605

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PARM, CCD, US, UK, GW, FR
SUBJECT: CONSULTATIONS WITH FRG, UK AND FRANCE ON
CHEMICAL WEAPONS AND RADIOLOGICAL WEAPONS

BEGIN SUMMARY: US CW DEL MEMBERS MET IN BONN WITH
FRG, UK AND FRENCH OFFICIALS TO CONSULT WITH THEM ON
THE CURRENT ISSUES IN US-USSR NEGOTIATIONS ON CHEMICAL
WEAPONS AND RADIOLOGICAL WEAPONS. END SUMMARY.

1. MEMBERS OF US CW DEL (TURRENTINE AND LEONARD),
ACCOMPANIED BY EMBOFF (KLEIN), MET IN BONN ON MAY 9
WITH FRG, UK AND FRENCH OFFICIALS TO CONSULT ON THE
STATUS OF US-USSR NEGOTIATIONS ON CHEMICAL WEAPONS (CW)
AND RADIOLOGICAL WEAPONS (RW). VON ARZ (DIRECTOR OF
OFFICE OF NUCLEAR AND TECHNICAL DISARMAMENT ISSUES, FRG
FOREIGN MINISTRY) CHAIRED MEETING; MUNGEAM (FCO) LEAD
UK DELEGATION; AND MASSETT FROM FRENCH EMBASSY IN BONN
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ALSO ATTENDED.

2. TURRENTINE GAVE A SUMMARY OF DEVELOPMENTS DURING
THE SEVENTH ROUND OF CW NEGOTIATIONS NOTING THAT US
SIDE HAD PUT FORWARD DETAILED VIEWS DURING THE LAST
HALF OF THE ROUND ON:

A. THE TREATMENT OF IRRITANTS.

B. PROCEDURES FOR CHALLENGE INSPECTION, INCLUDING RIGHTS AND FUNCTIONS OF INSPECTORS AND HOST PARTY.

C. QUANTITIES OF TOXIC CHEMICALS PERMITTED FOR PROTECTIVE PURPOSES.

D. THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A PREPARATORY COMMISSION AT THE TIME OF SIGNATURE.

3. WITH RESPECT CHANGES IN THE SOVIET POSITION DURING THE ROUND, IT WAS NOTED THAT:

A. SOVIETS HAVE AGREED TO ACCOMMODATE US INTEREST IN NOT HAVING THE CONVENTION INTERFERE WITH THE RETENTION OF RIOT CONTROL CHEMICALS IN CERTAIN DEFENSIVE MILITARY SITUATIONS.

B. SOVIETS HAVE AGREED IN PRINCIPLE TO TREAT SUPERTOXIC CHEMICALS DIFFERENTLY.

C. SOVIETS HAVE AGREED IN PRINCIPLE TO A CEILING ON QUANTITIES OF SUPERTOXIC CHEMICALS ALLOWED FOR PROTECTIVE PURPOSES.

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D. SOVIETS HAVE ACCEPTED US PROPOSAL ON TIMING (30 DAYS AFTER ENTRY INTO FORCE OF THE CONVENTION) OF DECLARATION OF STOCKS OF CW.

E. SOVIETS ARE WILLING TO AGREE THAT A PARTY WHICH REFUSES A REQUEST FOR AN ON-SITE INSPECTION (CHALLENGE INSPECTION) MUST PROVIDE A DETAILED EXPLANATION.

4. LEONARD PROVIDED DETAILS ON QUESTION OF IRRITANTS, SUPERTOXIC CRITERION, AND LIMITATION ON QUANTITIES OF SUPERTOXIC CHEMICALS PERMITTED FOR PROTECTIVE PURPOSES.

5. TURRENTINE ANALYZED THE MOST IMPORTANT ISSUES WHICH REMAIN TO BE RESOLVED INCLUDING:

A. THE MEANING OF THE SOVIET TERM "CAPABILITIES" AND ITS APPARENT CONTRADICTION WITH US CONCEPT OF FACILITIES."

B. DECLARATION OF CW FILLING AND PRODUCTION FACILITIES.

C. DISPOSITION OF CW FILLING AND PRODUCTION FACILITIES.

D. AGREED ON-SITE VERIFICATION (MANDATORY INTERNATIONAL

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P R 101537Z MAY 78
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 03 BONN 08605

INSPECTION) OF THE DESTRUCTION OF STOCKS.

E. AGREED ON-SITE VERIFICATION (MANDATORY INTERNATIONAL
INSPECTION) OF THE DISPOSITION OF CW FILLING FACILITIES.

F. AGREED ON-SITE VERIFICATION (MANDATORY INTERNATIONAL
INSPECTION) OF LIMITED PRODUCTION OF SUPERTOXIC CHEMICALS
FOR PROTECTIVE PURPOSES.

G. PROHIBITION OF SUPERTOXIC CHEMICALS FOR HOSTILE
MILITARY PURPOSES NOT RELATED TO CW.

7. THE FOLLOWING STATEMENTS WERE MADE AND QUESTIONS
ASKED AS INDICATED:

A. (UK) THE SOVIETS MAY WISH TO DELAY CW UNTIL AFTER
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A CTBT WITH THE INTENTION OF TRYING TO USE CTBT VERIFICATION PROCEDURES IN THE CONTEXT OF CW. IN THE UK VIEW CTB VERIFICATION PROCEDURES COULD NOT SERVE AS A PRECEDENT FOR CW.

B. (UK) THE STATUS QUO, WITH NO CW CONVENTION, IS MORE IN SOVIET INTEREST THAN IN WESTERN INTEREST.

C. (UK) QUESTION: IF THE NEGOTIATIONS CONTINUE ON INDEFINITELY WITHOUT A SATISFACTORY CONCLUSION, WILL NOT US STOCKS DETERIORATE PLACING THE SOVIETS IN AN EVEN MORE ADVANTAGEOUS POSITION THAN THEY NOW ARE?

ANSWER: IN THE LONG RUN THIS MAY BE TRUE, HOWEVER, THE PROBLEM IS MORE IN TERMS OF A UNHEALTHY TREND RATHER THAN A DANGEROUS, SUDDEN REDUCTION IN CURRENT CAPABILITIES.

D. (UK) WITH RESPECT TO CUT OFF DATE FOR FACILITIES, UK PREFERS 1940.

E. (FRG) WITH RESPECT TO CUT OFF DATE FOR DECLARING FACILITIES, FRG PREFERS 1947, BUT COULD ACCEPT 1940. HOWEVER, FRG DOESN'T BELIEVE 1940 DATE WOULD INCLUDE MANY MORE EXISTING SOVIET CW FACILITIES THAN 1947 DATE.

F. (FRG) QUESTION: IF THE NEGOTIATIONS DO NOT PRODUCE POSITIVE RESULTS, AT WHAT POINT WILL THE US PROCEED WITH THE PRODUCTION OF BINARY MUNITIONS?

ANSWER: THIS IS A POLITICAL QUESTION AND OF COURSE IS A MATTER FOR SENIOR POLICY MAKERS AND THE CONGRESS TO DECIDE. HOWEVER, IT IS FAIR TO SAY THAT THE

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PRESSURES FOR THE US TO BUILD A STANDBY BINARY PRODUCTION FACILITY ARE LIKELY TO INCREASE IF THERE IS NO PROGRESS IN THE NEGOTIATIONS, PARTICULARLY WITH RESPECT TO VERIFICATION.

G. (FRG) AT LEAST SOME QUARTERS IN THE FRG WOULD LIKE TO SEE THE US PROCEED WITH A BINARY PRODUCTION FACILITY.

H. (UK) QUESTION: WHEN WILL NEGOTIATIONS CONTINUE?

ANSWER: NO DATE HAS BEEN SET. THE US PROPOSED
JULY 26 AND THE SOVIETS SUGGESTED LATE AUGUST. AUGUST
2 MIGHT BE A POSSIBLE COMPROMISE.

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 03 OF 03 BONN 08605

I. (FRG) QUESTION: WHERE DO WE STAND WITH RESPECT
TO OUR ESTIMATE OF SOVIET CW CAPABILITIES?

ANSWER: THERE HAS BEEN SOME CONFUSION ON THIS
MATTER IN THE PAST. IT IS THE UNDERSTANDING OF THE
US SIDE THAT WE ALL AGREE THAT THE SOVIETS HAVE A
SIGNIFICANT CW CAPABILITY, BUT THAT CURRENTLY WE HAVE
NO AGREED ESTIMATE OF THE QUANTITY. THE US HAS THIS
ISSUE UNDER REVIEW IN THE CONTEXT OF A POSSIBLE CW
TREATY.

8. TURRENTINE ALSO REPORTED ON STATUS OF RW NEGOTIATIONS
INDICATING THAT AT THE END OF CURRENT ROUND US SIDE
HAD PRESENTED A REFORMULATION OF ELEMENTS ON SCOPE AND
DEFINITION WHICH SHOULD SOLVE CONCERNS SOVIETS HAD

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PREVIOUSLY EXPRESSED. THE ONLY SIGNIFICANT ADDITIONAL
ISSUES WHICH REMAIN TO BE SETTLED ARE THE FORMAT OF
THE JOINT INITIATIVE (THE US SIDE PREFERRING MAIN
ELEMENTS DRAFTED IN WAR-TREATY LANGUAGE AND THE SOVIET
SIDE A FULLY ELABORATED DRAFT TREATY TEXT) AND PROVISION
FOR CAREFULLY SPECIFIED CHALLENGE ON-SITE INSPECTION.
HE STATED THAT COMPLETE AGREEMENT MIGHT BE REACHED ON
A JOINT INITIATIVE AT OUR EARLY DATE, IN WHICH CASE THE
US WOULD MOST CERTAINLY BE CONSULTING WITH ALLIES PRIOR
TO THE PRESENTATION OF SUCH AN INITIATIVE TO THE CCD.
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Message Attributes

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